Bearings

Nov 3, 2026
Nov 3, 2026
HUMAN FACTORS · controlled simulation study, part of a replicated literature · 2005

Trusting Automation Makes Experts Miss Its Failures

Setup. Cockpits, hospitals, and nuclear control rooms added computerized monitors and decision aids to reduce human error. Automation bias is the finding that this can backfire: people favor an automated system's suggestion and discount contradicting evidence, even their own expertise, simply because a machine produced it.

The finding. In a 2005 study, air traffic controllers ran a high-fidelity simulation with an automated tool that flagged aircraft on a collision course minutes ahead. When researchers disabled the tool near the end of the test, "considerably fewer controllers detected the conflict than when the situation was handled manually." Separately, pilots given a false alert to shut off a working engine did so, despite insisting afterward they would not have.

Where it stands. This is a replicated applied finding across aviation, medicine, and the military, not one lab result. A 2007 study proposed automation stops being a net benefit once its reliability drops below roughly 70 percent, a specific but less certain number. Training reduces one error, acting on a bad alert, but not the other, missing a failure automation never flagged.

Automation bias · Wikipedia · 2005 ↗
GAME THEORY · formal index applied to a real voting board · 1965

A Voting Board Gave Three Towns Zero Power

Setup. Many organizations split voting rights unevenly, corporate boards, weighted legislatures, the Electoral College, assuming a bigger vote share means more real influence. In 1965, law professor John Banzhaf devised a direct test: across every winning coalition, count how often each voter's vote actually decides the outcome.

The finding. Banzhaf applied this to the Nassau County, New York Board of Supervisors, where six municipalities held between 9 and 1 votes of 30, needing 16 to pass a measure. The three smallest municipalities, holding 5 of the 30 votes combined, never turned out to be the decisive vote in any winning coalition. "Banzhaf argued that a voting arrangement that gives 0% of the power to 16% of the population is unfair."

Where it stands. This is a proven mathematical result, not a contested claim, and it remains a standard tool for analyzing weighted votes in bodies like the European Council. Its real limit is the model underneath it: Banzhaf treated each vote as an independent coin flip, and a model based on how voters and blocs actually behave gives different answers.

John Banzhaf · Banzhaf power index (Wikipedia) · 1965 ↗
CRIMINAL JUSTICE HISTORY · historical case study, 1998 book · 1865-1883

Police Chose To Regulate Vice, Not End It

Setup. In the late 1800s, American cities faced a problem city governments still face: how to handle something widely viewed as immoral and dangerous, prostitution, tied then to syphilis, an incurable disease, when police lack the resources to eliminate it. Sociologist Joel Best's 1998 study traces how St. Paul, Minnesota, answered that question between 1865 and 1883.

What happened. Rather than attempt full suppression, St. Paul's undermanned police force chose a middle path. "Police also allowed for the toleration of several regulated brothels, but they must be seen to by officials of the law with the ability to arrest by means to maintain order." By 1880, the city had seven recognized brothels, and officers arrested roughly 14 madams a year, mostly to enforce licensing terms rather than end the trade.

Where it stands. This is a single documented case, not a general law, but the mechanism recurs wherever enforcement capacity is outmatched by the behavior it targets: institutions trade elimination for contained, licensed tolerance. The same logic shows up in modern vice zoning and in how cities handle drug markets they cannot fully suppress.

Joel Best · Controlling Vice (Wikipedia) · 1998 ↗
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY · original theory paper, 1965 · 1965

Rare Choices Reveal People, Common Ones Reveal Nothing

Setup. When someone picks one option over another, how much does that choice really reveal about who they are? In 1965, psychologists Edward Jones and Keith Davis proposed correspondent inference theory to answer this precisely: an observer can infer a stable trait from a choice only under specific, nameable conditions, not from the mere fact that a choice was made.

The argument. The key condition is what Jones and Davis called non-common effects. "The fewer effects the possible choices have in common, the more confident one can be in inferring a correspondent disposition." A student choosing one near-identical university over another reveals almost nothing distinctive about their motives, because the two options share too much. The theory adds that unusual, socially undesirable, or role-defying choices carry far more information than ordinary, expected ones.

Where it stands. This is the original 1965 theory, not a later replication, and it still anchors modern attribution research. Its own prediction, that people should discount choices made under situational pressure, often fails in practice: later studies show observers over-attribute scripted statements to true belief even when the pressure on the speaker is obvious.

Edward Jones and Keith Davis · Correspondent inference theory (Wikipedia) · 1965 ↗
BUSINESS HISTORY · bestseller's own case, checked by an independent stock analysis · 1982

A Flawed Study Method Still Beat The Market

Setup. In 1982, consultants Tom Peters and Robert Waterman published a hugely influential study of 43 "excellent" American companies, chosen partly by asking McKinsey partners who was "cool." The book skipped a basic scientific control: a comparison group of companies that did not thrive.

What happened. Management scholar Phil Rosenzweig later called this the halo effect: you cannot find the traits that cause success by studying only companies that already succeeded. Several of the 43, including Wang Labs and Xerox, performed badly afterward. Yet a 2002 Forbes analysis found the "excellence" companies as a group still beat the market: "the companies on the authors' list earned an average total return of 1,305%, or 14.1% annually," against 11.3% for the Dow and 10.1% for the S&P 500 since 1982.

Where it stands. The individual stock picks aged poorly, exactly as the halo-effect critique would predict from a study with no control group. The aggregate result did not, and neither the methodology nor its critics fully explain why. Read it as a case where a flawed research method still stumbled onto a real signal, not proof the method itself worked.

Tom Peters · In Search of Excellence (Wikipedia) · 1982 ↗
Nov 2, 2026
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY · controlled experiment on toddlers · 2011

Toddlers Learn Better From A Trusted Character

Setup. Sesame Street characters speak straight to the camera, and kids often feel a one-sided friendship with them, a bond researchers call parasocial interaction. The open question is whether that felt bond does anything beyond entertainment.

The finding. In a 2011 study, researchers taught eight 21-month-old American infants to nest a set of cups in order, using one of two on-screen characters: Elmo, instantly recognizable to American toddlers, or DoDo, popular in Taiwan but unfamiliar in the United States. "Children were better able to learn from the socially meaningful character (Elmo) than from the character who was less easily recognized (DoDo)." A later study closed that gap by personalizing the unfamiliar character, giving toddlers a doll version to name and play with first.

Where it stands. The sample is small, eight infants, typical of lab studies run on toddlers this young, so the size of the effect should be held loosely. The direction fits a broader pattern in the same research program: a stronger felt bond with a media character tracks with how much a child learns from it, not just how much they enjoy it.

Sandra Calvert · Parasocial interaction (Wikipedia) · 2011 ↗
URBAN ECONOMICS · named paradox, documented in one city case study · 1990

Wider Roads Can Make Traffic Permanently Worse

Setup. A city adds lanes to a jammed highway, expecting faster commutes. The Downs-Thomson paradox, named for economists Anthony Downs and John Michael Thomson, says that will not work alone. Equilibrium traffic speed is set by the door-to-door speed of the next-best alternative, usually the subway or bus, not by how much road space exists.

The argument. Widening the road pulls transit riders into their cars, thins transit ridership, and degrades the alternative that was keeping car speeds in check. "Any improvements in road networks lead to no alleviation of congestion, but usually more use of those roads." Economist Martin Mogridge documented this in a 1990 case study of London: each round of road expansion drew more driving, not less.

Where it stands. This is an equilibrium model, not a universal law, and it only bites where transit is a real substitute commuters would otherwise use. A related result, Braess's paradox, shows added capacity can reduce network performance directly, in computer networks as well as roads. That road capacity alone does not fix congestion is now standard among transport economists, though the effect's size in any one city stays hard to pin down.

Martin Mogridge · Downs–Thomson paradox (Wikipedia) · 1990 ↗
SOCIOLOGY · original 1938 theory, tested in five later studies · 1938

Who Needs You Less Holds The Power

Setup. In any two-person relationship, power rarely splits evenly. Sociologist Willard Waller named the imbalance in 1938: whoever holds less emotional stake in a relationship controls it, because they can walk away at a smaller cost to themselves than their partner can.

The argument. "The person or group that has the least interest in continuing a relationship has the most power over it." Later studies tested the claim directly. A 1972 survey of 113 college students found men consistently less emotionally invested than women in the same relationships. A 1994 study of 413 heterosexual adults found the partner who felt less involved also held more say over shared decisions, including birth control.

Where it stands. The pattern replicates across decades and relationship types, including a 1984 study in which 40 percent of surveyed lesbian couples reported an unequal balance of power, always favoring the less-dependent partner. This is a structural observation about leverage, not a lab-tested causal mechanism, and the studies lean on small, self-selected samples. The same logic extends past dating into any negotiation: whoever can walk away more cheaply sets the terms.

Willard Waller · Principle of least interest (Wikipedia) · 1938 ↗
PSYCHOLOGY · essayist's argument with one self-experiment · Jul 2026

No One Has Ever Catalogued the Human Drives

Setup. Chemistry became a real science once chemists listed the elements. The blog Slime Mold Time Mold argues psychology never did that for human motivation: nobody has tried to list every drive, hunger, fear, status-seeking, that pushes people to act.

The argument. "There are lots of drives that we haven't discovered, and the distinctions we have are totally informal." A single hunger drive cannot explain why people crave salt, sugar, or one food on one day, so several hunger drives tied to specific nutrients must exist. One contributor who craved iodine-rich seaweed snacks took iodine supplements for 27 days and reported that by day 18 the snacks tasted like dry plastic, as if a hidden iodine drive had switched off.

Where it stands. This is a research proposal dressed as an essay, not a settled finding, and one person's experiment proves little alone. The chemistry analogy is suggestive, not demonstrated: an element can be weighed, while a drive has no agreed test for existing at all. It is worth holding loosely, as a frame for noticing how little is known about why people want what they want.

Slime Mold Time Mold · You Can Discover the Drives · Jul 2026 ↗
ARCHITECTURE HISTORY · essayist's case study, documented funding dispute · Oct 2026

Ornate Architecture Dies From Fatigue, Not Just Cost

Setup. Art Nouveau, the swirling, plant-inspired style behind Gaudí's Sagrada Família, broke deliberately from centuries of copying older architecture and spread across Europe around 1890 to 1910. It vanished within twenty years, replaced almost everywhere by a return to classicism. An Asterisk essayist uses one building to ask why.

The argument. At Barcelona's Sant Pau hospital, archival records show a fight between leaders who wanted plain, fast-built wards and the patron's executors who wanted an architectural statement. "The latter group won, which is why there’s an architecture masterpiece in Barcelona that we can visit. However, this had the unfortunate consequence that some of the pavilions built later are less elaborate, because the project was running out of money." The essayist adds his own account: ornament produces a "wow" effect that fades into cognitive load, while classical architecture stays available as a style to return to.

Where it stands. The funding conflict is documented history, not speculation. The cognitive-load explanation for the style's decline is the essayist's own interpretation from visiting the buildings, offered without a controlled test, a plausible frame rather than a settled finding.

Asterisk · Why Don't We Live in an Art Nouveau World? · Oct 2026 ↗
Nov 1, 2026
CRIMINOLOGY · theory corroborated by a documented policy natural experiment · 1979

A Helmet Law Cut Motorcycle Theft By Two Thirds

Setup. Criminologists long split over whether crime comes mainly from an offender's character or from the situation an offender meets. In 1979, Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson proposed crime opportunity theory: a crime needs a motivated offender, a suitable target, and no capable guardian, all converging at once. Remove any one leg, and the crime does not happen.

What happened. Germany supplied an accidental test of the theory. "The thefts of motorbikes had drastically declined from about 150,000 in 1980 to about 50,000 in 1986. This tremendous decline was the result of a new law passed in 1980 making it illegal to ride a motorbike in Germany without a helmet." The law changed no one's character. It just made an unattended bike a harder target, cutting thefts by two thirds in six years, while car and bicycle theft rose only slightly over the same stretch.

Where it stands. The German data is a clean, measured natural experiment, rare in criminology, and the field's usual displacement critique, that blocked crime just moves elsewhere, held only weakly here. The theory's real limit is scope: it explains how to shrink specific opportunities, not how to reduce the underlying motive to offend.

Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson · Crime opportunity theory (Wikipedia) · 1979 ↗
SOCIOLOGY · essayist's argument built on demographic data · Oct 2026

A Surplus Of Men Or Women Rewrites Dating Rules

Setup. Commentators have been puzzled that young people today have less casual sex than their parents' generation, reversing a decades-long trend. Works in Progress editor Aria Schrecker argues the reversal has little to do with morals and everything to do with a simple number: the ratio of young men to young women looking to date, which has flipped twice in a century.

The argument. When one sex outnumbers the other, the scarcer sex sets the terms. "From the end of the Second World War until 1961 every cohort of babies was bigger than the one before: 3.7 million were born in 1950, 3.8 million in 1951, and 3.9 in 1952. The average age gap between couples was two years meaning there were only 1.85 million boys born in 1950 for the 1.95 million girls born in 1952, creating an oversupply of 105 women for every 100 men a couple of years older than them." Schrecker argues that postwar surplus of women is what let casual sex expand for fifty years. Falling birth rates since the 2000s have now reversed the ratio.

Where it stands. The mechanism has real supporting cases beyond the US: India's rising dowries, the ultra-Orthodox "shidduch crisis," and campus studies where female-skewed schools show less dating leverage for women. Schrecker flags her own risk of overfitting a pattern to the data, and no one has run a controlled test of the theory at national scale.

Aria Schrecker · Works in Progress · Oct 2026 ↗
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY · foundational 1905 thesis, tested against modern city data · 1905

A Famous Capitalism Thesis Failed Its Modern Test

Setup. In 1905, Max Weber argued that modern capitalism grew out of Protestant, especially Calvinist, religious anxiety. Unable to know if they were saved, Calvinists looked for worldly signs of grace: hard work, thrift, and a refusal to spend on luxury. That psychological search for reassurance, Weber claimed, built the discipline and capital accumulation that let capitalism take off in Northern Europe.

What happened. A century later, economists tested the claim against real city-level records. "In a 2015 study, Davide Cantoni tested Weber's Protestant hypothesis on German cities over the period 1300–1900, finding no effects of Protestantism on economic growth." An earlier review by a Swedish economic historian reached a similar verdict: where it could be measured, a city's economic progress showed no reliable link to whether it was Protestant or Catholic.

Where it stands. Weber's thesis remains one of sociology's most cited arguments, but the direct empirical record it claims to explain does not support it. Other researchers using different proxies, wage growth rather than city growth, have found a Protestant effect, so the dispute is active rather than settled, and no side has produced a clean, replicated causal test.

Max Weber · The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism · 1905 ↗
MARKET ECONOMICS · documented pricing case, cited in a regulator's speech · 2017

Two Pricing Algorithms Bid A Textbook To $23 Million

Setup. Competitors can coordinate prices without ever speaking to each other, a pattern antitrust law calls tacit collusion. Each firm simply watches its rivals and matches or undercuts them, producing coordinated pricing that looks like an illegal agreement but breaks no law, since no communication occurred. The behavior is old, but pricing algorithms have made it automatic and faster than any human could manage.

What happened. In a 2017 speech on algorithms and collusion, EU competition commissioner Margrethe Vestager cited a case that got away from its own authors. "A few years ago, two companies were selling a textbook called The Making of a Fly. One of those sellers used an algorithm which essentially matched its rival's price. That rival had an algorithm which always set a price 27% higher than the first. The result was that prices kept spiralling upwards, until finally someone noticed what was going on, and adjusted the price manually. By that time, the book was selling – or rather, not selling – for 23 million dollars a copy."

Where it stands. A separate dataset of Perth gasoline prices from 2001 to 2015, cited alongside this case, shows the same pattern at ordinary commercial stakes: a price leader, followed moves, and growing margins. Courts still struggle to tell lawful price-watching from illegal coordination when no message ever passes between firms.

Margrethe Vestager · Tacit collusion (Wikipedia) · 2017 ↗
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY · meta-analysis of 22 studies · 1981

We Blame Victims More When They Differ From Us

Setup. When misfortune strikes someone else, a crash, an assault, an onlooker decides who is to blame. Psychologists Elaine Walster and Kelly Shaver proposed in the 1960s and 1970s that this judgment is not neutral: it defends the onlooker's own sense of safety.

The argument. Shaver tested the idea by describing the same misfortune to subjects while varying how similar the people involved were made to seem. "as similarity with witnesses increased, attributions of responsibility decreased." In 1981 Jerry Burger pooled 22 peer-reviewed studies and found the pattern held broadly: the less someone resembles us, the more responsibility we assign them for their own misfortune, because blaming a dissimilar victim lets an onlooker believe bad things only happen to people unlike them.

Where it stands. Burger's meta-analysis gives the bias real breadth beyond any single lab study. A 2008 review of rape scenarios found the same effect in a higher-stakes setting, with participants blaming the perpetrator more when they saw themselves as similar to the victim. The mechanism is well replicated, though how strongly it carries to an actual jury room remains untested.

Jerry Burger · Defensive attribution hypothesis (Wikipedia) · 1981 ↗
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